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The basis of this research project is the computer simulation of the emergence of ethnicity and cultural differenti ­
ation in Prehistory. We propose a predictive simulation of a historical case where the knowledge about the simu ­
lated social system is available at the necessary level of detail, using data from archaeological, ethnological, and  
historical research. The aim of this research is to test existing social theories of social evolution through history by  
creating a computer model of a theoretically possible society in which we may identify yet unknown social relation ­
ships and interactions.
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1. Introduction. 
The  identification  of  "ethnic  groups"  in  the  usage  of 
social  scientists  has  often  reflected  inaccurate  labels 
more  than  social  realities.  That  is  to  say,  the 
identification  of  an  ethnic  group  by  outsiders,  e.g. 
anthropologists,  may  not  coincide  with  the  self-
identification of the members of that group.
An ethnic group is a group of people whose members 
explicitly regard themselves and are regarded by others 
as truly distinctive, through a common heritage that is 
real  or  assumed-  sharing  “cultural”  characteristics. 
Members of an ethnic group are conscious of belonging 
to  a  differentiated  group;  moreover  ethnic  identity  is 
further  marked  by  the  recognition  from  others  of  a 
group's  distinctiveness  (BARTH,  1969;  VINCENT, 
1974; JONES, 1997; COHEN, 2000).
Additionally,  it  can be argued that  the components of 
ethnicity  mostly  arise  in  situations  of  contact  and 
contrast,  being  interaction the  motor of  generation  of 
categories of ascription and ethnic differentiation. Such 
an  interaction  should  be  considered  both  positive 
(exchange) and negative (conflict),  in such a way that 
different  ways  of  social  fusion,  fission  and  friction 
develops a set of representations and values that set the 
terms from which social clustering and self-ascriptions 
are constructed. 
Processes  that  result  in  the  emergence  of  such 
inclusiveness  are  called ethnogenesis (WEBER, 1922; 
BANTON, 2007). Given that those processes should be 
analyzed  in  behavioral  terms,  we  should  accentuate 
dynamic and negotiable social identities, involving both 
social  permeability  of  borders  and  rejecting  the 
monolithic categories of common cultural forms such as 
language or particular genetic or cultural traits. 
The  key  of  our  perspective  is  that  any  shared  traits 
among  agents,  their  behavior,  their  beliefs,  and  their 
language, the products of their work and/or the material 
or  immaterial  results  of  their  actions  should  be 
contingent  to  the  social  interaction  process  that 
generated  those  traits.  In  so  saying,  we  follow  a 
constructive approach to “ethnicity”. 
This  conception  of  ethnicity  is  hardly  applicable  to 
prehistory,  given  the  limitation  of  data.  The  only 
knowledge about the most remote past is composed by 
the  material  consequences  of  actions  having  been 
performed  then.  As  a  consequence,  archaeologists 
usually  emphasize  “observable  similarities”  as  a 
surrogate of “ethnicity”.
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Certainly, ethnic groups are usually expressed as a set of 
shared  norms,  transmitted  through  beliefs,  religion, 
language.  The  similarity  in  language  and  material 
culture  or  the  constriction  of  groups  to  a  restricted 
geographical area can be regarded as the consequence of 
people that worked together and had common goals, and 
people  that  segregate  those  who  neither  work  nor 
cooperate  with  them.  The  similarity  in  biological 
phenotype, for instance, is the result of the way agents 
that  reproduce  among  them  chose  their  reproductive 
mates  within  an  already  defined  group.  The  more 
cultural  transmission  among individuals  connected  by 
the same social network, the more similar are the agents, 
their  actions  and  the  material  and  immaterial 
consequences of their actions.
Nevertheless, relying only on observable similarities is 
misleading  because  the  mere  commonality  is  not  a 
sufficient  condition to  understand the formation of an 
aggregate  of  people.  Materially  expressed,  cultural 
boundaries  are  not  always  clearly  defined,  nor 
necessarily correspond with ethnic boundaries. Then, is 
the  archaeological  study  of  prehistoric  ethnicities 
impossible ?
We cannot travel to the past in an effective way but we 
can do it in a virtual way. History only runs once, but 
inside a computer a virtual model of the historical past 
may run infinitely many times. In the computer, we can 
explore  (by altering the  variables)  the  entire  possible 
range  of  outcomes  for  different  past  behaviors.  The 
basis of this research project is then simulating inside a 
computer what we know about actions that took place in 
the past  and  experimenting with the effects  they may 
produce in such a virtual world.
Our aim is to simulate human beings “living” in a virtual 
environment that is an abstraction defined by us on the 
basis of social theory and/or historical data (BARCELÓ, 
2008).  In  the framework of agent-based modeling, the 
artificial societies we aim at building are based on a set 
of simulated social agents represented as members of an 
evolving  (virtual)  population  of  social  procedures 
(mechanisms), which determine important aspects of the 
population structure and development and therefore of 
the  individual’s  behavior.  Inside  the  computer 
simulation, and similarly to what prehistoric people did 
in their real world, computer agents act as influenced by 
other  agents reinforcing some actions,  interfering with 
others,  and  even  sometimes  preventing  the  action  of 
other people. 
Running  a  computer  model  of  a  prehistoric  society 
simply amounts to instantiate the simulated populations 
of  people,  letting  the  agents  interact,  and  monitoring 
what  emerges.  Although  embodied  agents  tend  to  be 
computationally  simple  and  they  “virtually”  live  in 
computationally simplified environments, if one places 
many  agents  together  in  the  same  environment 
interesting  collective  behaviors  tend  to  emerge  from 
their  interactions.  What  emerges from  the  collective 
execution  of  rules  packaged  in  form  of  agents  is  a 
gradual updating of agent’s beliefs and the concomitant 
modification  of  their  plans,  arriving at  some form of 
social order. This should be conceived as any form of 
systemic structuring which is sufficiently stable,  to be 
considered  the consequence of social  self-organization 
and self-reproduction through the actions of the agents, 
or consciously orchestrated by (some of) them.
2. The Case of Prehistoric Patagonia.
Instead  of  working directly on  a  universal  theoretical 
model,  we have preferred a predictive simulation of a 
historical case where the knowledge about the simulated 
social system is available at a necessary level of detail, 
using  data  from  archaeological,  ethnological,  and 
historical  research.  The aim of this research is to test 
existing  social  theories  of  social  evolution  through 
history  by  creating  different  computer  models  of 
theoretically possible societies in which we may identify 
yet unknown social relationships and interactions. 
Why  Patagonia?  The  historical  process  of  those 
societies  is  well  known not  only through archaeology 
but also from the ethnographical record (BARCELÓ et  
al.,  2009).  Some years  ago,  hunter  gatherer  practices 
coexisted with a capitalist economy. 
As  in  any  hunter-gatherer  historical  situation, 
Patagonians moved from place to place for social and 
political needs, in such a way that extremely long and 
complex  interaction  net-works  developed.  Goods  and 
information  traveled  more  than  people  would. 
Therefore, physical mobility was an economic strategy, 
socially implemented,  that  allowed the exploitation of 
wider  economic  territories  and  simultaneously 
contributed to the creation of social ex-change networks. 
As a consequence of these mobility patterns, linguistic, 
cultural,  economic  and  even  territorial  frontiers  were 
extremely permeable, suggesting a considerable degree 
of population mixture. 
In  Patagonia,  biological  and  linguistic  differentiation 
among  human groups  has  been  found  to  be  strongly 
associated  with  spatial  separation.  According  to  this 
view, we propose an “isolation by distance” hypothesis 
predicting  that  human  groups  will  reflect  geographic 
separation  in  the  pattern  of  their  between-group 
distances.  The  eventual  result  is  a  greater  similarity 
between  geographically  proximal  populations  and 
increasing differences  between groups  that  are  further 
and further apart. 
The  key of  our  explanatory model  is  that  any shared 
traits  among  prehistoric  Patagonian  inhabitants,  their 
behavior, their beliefs, and their language, the products 
of their work and/or the material or immaterial results of 
their  actions  should  be  contingent  to  the  social 
interaction processes  that  generated  those  traits.  After 
all,  what  has  traditionally  been  called  “ethnic” 
differentiation is nothing more than a consequence  of 
the diverse degrees of social interaction between human 
communities.  In  so  saying,  we  suggest  that  the 
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emergence  of  groups  or  clusters  of  social  agents 
(“ethnic” groups) in Patagonia was the consequence of 
the way different social agents interacted along a period 
of time. And they may have interacted for many reasons 
and in many ways: cooperating to acquire subsistence, 
cooperating  to  produce  tools  and  instruments, 
cooperating  to  exchange  subsistence  and/or  tools, 
cooperating for  reproducing themselves,  refusing such 
cooperation, or compelling other agents to work in their 
own benefit, etc. War and conflict are also another kind 
of interac-tion. In  all  those cases,  interactions vary in 
intensity and frequency defining a complex network of 
positive or negative intergroup relationships. As a result, 
agents adopt similar activities, and their actions tend to 
generate similar results. 
3. A preliminary computer model of Ethnicity 
Formation
Obviously  we  cannot  implement  the  complexities  of 
ethnogenesis formation in a computer model. We prefer 
to implement some parts of a future computer model to 
understand  the  social  mechanisms  involved  in  the 
emergence of social order.  Some enhancements to this 
model are foreseen, as it will be explained later.
The  preliminary  model  is  very  simple  but  it  makes 
emphasis  on  the  main  components  to  understand  the 
emergence  of  ethnicity  (Figure  1).  Let  us  imagine  a 
population of virtual agents, moving randomly in search 
for  resources,  and  organized in households  as  ancient 
Patagonians  did.  There  are  two  kinds  of  economic 
activities:  gathering,  which  is  an  individual  task,  and 
hunting,  which is only possible when the members  of 
different, culturally similar households cooperate. There 
are  increasing returns  to  cooperation,  i.e.  families  get 
more  resources  working  together  than  individually, 
modulated  by  the  global  parameter  returns-to-
cooperation.  Nevertheless,  hunting is  also  affected  by 
diminishing marginal returns relative to the number of 
cooperating households (another model parameter).  To 
find cooperators, households should interact with others 
within  a  single  local  neighborhood  –its  geographical 
radius is a model parameter–, within the limits allowed 
by their perceived cultural similarity. Households have a 
distinctive cultural identity, modeled as a F dimensional 
space of cultural features, each with q different cultural 
traits.  This  is  a  surrogate  for  language  and  cultural 
values  differences.  In  this  simple  model  we  are  not 
interested  in  the  precise  representation  of  what 
differentiate “cultures”, but only in the intensity of such 
a  difference.  Cultural  similarity  is  measured  as  the 
relative  number  of  shared  cultural  dimensions. 
Consequently,  two households  consider  themselves  as 
belonging  to  the  same  “ethnic”  group  if  they  are 
appropriately culturally similar, that is, if their cultural 
similarity  is  above  a  critical  threshold,  also  a  model 
parameter.
“Culture”  diffuses  within  population  through  a  local 
imitation  process.  With  a  fixed  probability  level  a 
household copies some trait of the mode of her group, in 
such  a  way that  consensus  increases  and  “culturally” 
homogeneous  groups  tend  to  emerge.  Moreover, 
“culture”  evolves  through  local  mutation,  that  is,  the 
attained levels of “cultural” identity are also subject to 
random cultural drift. With a fixed probability level, a 
household  mutates  one  of  her  cultural  traits  which  is 
simultaneously  copied  by  her  group  (we  assume that 
geographical  proximity ensures  that  the  culture  of  all 
group members evolves in the same direction).
In a preliminary and oversimplified implementation, we 
consider  only  a  constant  population  of  agents 
(households), moving randomly in search for resources 
and  interacting  with  others  located  in  the  same 
geographical  area  and  belonging  to  the  same  ethnic 
group, in order to enhance their chances of subsisting. 
Local interactions facilitate cultural diffusion and ethnic 
differentiation.
At  a  time  period  t the  household  j gets  resources 
according to the following production function (Eq.1):
O j t  =
c j
∑
k∈G j t 
ck ∑k∈G j ck

= c j ∑k∈G j  t ck
−1
with   1
where  ck are  the families capacities and  θ  modulates  
increasing  returns  to  cooperation.  The  surplus  of  the 
household j depends on a depreciation parameter k and a 
minimum subsistence. Therefore, according to the Eq.2:
S j t1 = [O jt S j t 1−−So ]
Families' maximum age follows a Poisson distribution 
whose mean is the parameter life-expectancy. Whenever 
a household dies, either by old age or starving, she is 
replaced. The newcomer inherits the characteristics of a 
household in the population chosen through a roulette 
wheel,  i.e.  families  have  a  probability  of  being 
replicated directly proportional to their capacities.
4. A Netlogo implementation
An  implementation  of  the  previous  model  can  be 
downloaded from:
http://ingor.ubu.es/models/patagonia/simple1.0
Figure  2  shows  the  Netlogo  initial  window  with  the 
different parameters that can be selected and updated by 
the user. Figure 3 depicts Netlogo world view of three 
system states: at the beginning, after the first time steps, 
when households spread through the virtual landscape, 
and  at  the  time  when  emergence  of  different  ethnic 
groups is observed.
5. Preliminary results
Our  model  has  the  same assumptions  as  the  classical 
Axelrod’s Dissemination of Culture model (1997):
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1. people are more likely to interact with others who 
share many of their cultural attributes, and 
2. these interactions tend to increase the number of 
cultural  attributes  they share  (thus making them more 
likely to interact again). 
We  also  confirm  that  the  degree  of  cultural 
differentiation, and hence the emergence of more or less 
“ethnic” groups seems to depend on:
1. the number F of cultural features that characterize 
each agent, 
2. the number q of traits that each feature can take on, 
3. the  size  A of  the  territory  or,  equivalently,  the 
number of interacting agents. 
But  the  main  result  of  our  simplified  model  is  the 
emergence  of  ethnicity  and  the  partitioning  of  social 
networks even in the case of a constant population. In 
other words, cultural diversity not only depends on the 
size of population or on the extension of territory, but it  
is  socially  mediated  by  many  other  social  feed-back 
processes that affect the way homogeneous groups are 
born,  reproduce  and  die.  Ethnic  partitioning  follows 
culture differentiation which also follows the intensity 
and  reproduction  of  labor  cooperation.  This  is  a 
complex  social  mechanism  characterized  by  the 
dialectical  relationship  between  the  higher  payoffs  of 
cooperation,  the  local  carrying  capacity,  the  level  of 
technological  development,  and  the  risk  of  increasing 
social  stress  when  surplus  accumulates  and  wealth 
becomes unequally distributed.
The simulated model shows how “cultural proximity” –
the  threshold  required  for  two  households  to  regard 
themselves as belonging to the same group– influences 
the intensity of “ethnic” ties. When such a threshold is 
low (e.g.  δ=0.2)  the population evolves as one simple 
ethnic  group  because  cultural  mutation  and  local 
diffusion processes are not strong enough to break its 
ethnic  identity.  However,  when  it  is  higher,  local 
differentiation forces (mutation and diffusion) can split 
the population into different ethnic groups.
On  the  other  hand,  the  ethnic  fragmentation  in  our 
model  depends  mainly  on  the  importance  of  the 
increasing returns of cooperation.  In  the case of poor 
economic revenues from collaborative labour,  there  is 
no significant benefit  in social  interaction (see Eq.  1) 
and a household will have the same opportunities living 
alone or within a group. In such a scenario, we observe 
the repeated formation of differentiated groups (higher 
ethnogenesis).  When  the  economic  returns  of 
cooperation  are  higher,  those  households  which 
collaborate  within  a  group  get  more  surplus  and 
therefore more replications in the future generations. In 
doing  so,  the  population  fragments  into  a  smaller 
number  of  groups,  hence  there  is  less  ethnic 
differentiation.  This  effect  saturates  for  high  enough 
values  of  cooperation  returns,  where  we  observe  a 
minimum in the number of ethnic groups that depends 
on the natural noise of the system (due to mutation and 
replacement processes). 
Those  results  are  congruent  with  what  we  know  of 
Patagonian prehistory,  where social fusion tends to be 
less frequent than the fission of former groups, basically 
by the cost due to diminishing marginal returns relative 
to the number of households cooperating. Only if some 
individuals  within  the  group  increase  their  own 
productivity and the absolute volume of their production 
above a critical threshold, they can invest such a surplus 
to increase coercion, and hence maintain ever increasing 
levels of social inequality. Without a dramatic change in 
technology (i.e.  agriculture,  pastoralism) we think that 
this social change is rare.
Conclusions
This  preliminary  and  simplified  model  of  ethnicity 
formation is based on 11 parameters:
• n-households: number  of  households  (it 
remains constant during the simulation)
• neighborhood-radius: radius of the household's 
neighborhood
• %cultural-proximity: minimum relative number 
of cultural dimensions that two households should share 
in order to regard themselves as belonging to the same 
ethnic group
• cultural-dimensions: number  of  cultural 
dimensions
• cultural-traits: number of possible cultural traits 
for each dimension
• p-cult-diffusion: probability  that  a  household 
copies some cultural trait of the mode of her group
• p-cult-mutation:  probability  that  a  household 
mutates  one  of  her  cultural  traits,  which  is 
simultaneously copied by all members of her group
• returns-to-cooperation: parameter  that 
modulates the increasing returns to cooperation of the 
household's production function (see Eq.1)
• subsistence: minimum  surplus  necessary  to 
survive in a time period
• surplus-depreciation: rate of surplus decay, or 
depreciation
• life-expectancy: mean  of  the  Poisson 
distribution that describes families' maximum ages
The  most relevant  aspect  of  this  initial  model  is  that 
ethnic  groups  have  not  been  implemented  as  fixed 
entities,  but  they emerge as a consequence of cultural 
proximity relative to geographical neighborhood and the 
possibilities  of  joint  collaboration.  Individual 
households  do  not  have  information  about  all  ethnic 
groups  in  the  population,  they  only  can  differentiate 
other  households  in  their  neighborhood  and  they  are 
allowed to build positive or negative connections with 
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them  in  consequence.  Ethnicity appears  then  as  an 
emerging partition and as an evolving social  network, 
whose  formative  and  “deformative”  dynamics  is  what 
we want to study. Modulated by the cultural proximity 
parameter, the effect of increasing returns to cooperation 
is  to  facilitate  the emergence  of  larger  ethnic groups. 
Ethnicity appears to be a consequence of territorial and 
social  mobility,  mediated  by  the  history  of  previous 
interactions  and  the  degree  of  cultural  similarity,  the 
payoffs  derived  from cooperation  (collective  hunting, 
material  exchange,  social  reproduction)  and  the  costs 
generated by internal social conflict (social friction and 
fission).  The  model  is  based  on  the  assumption  that 
social behavior in groups is regulated by norms in such a 
way  that  interactions  between  individuals  who  share 
beliefs  about  how people  should  behave  yield  higher 
payoffs than interactions among people with discordant 
beliefs.  Nevertheless,  the  sharing  of  social  norms 
constitutes a historical result of the previous number of 
interactions, and this number is also a consequence of 
the different possibilities groups and individuals have of 
deciding for strategies of collective labor or individual 
subsistence  acquisition.  In  its  turn,  the  number  of 
individuals also depends on the number of couples the 
internal  structure  of  the  group  allows.  Consequently, 
even the demographic rhythm of the group is socially 
mediated:  cooperative  groups  should  be  more 
productive  and  also  have  more  offspring  than  non-
cooperative groups. 
Nevertheless, if it is not the belief that creates the group, 
but  the  group  that  creates  the  belief  in  a  shared 
community of features we need to find an external factor 
giving  feedback  to  the  dynamics  of  aggregation  and 
segregation. Social Influence can be a good candidate 
for such a factor. 
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FIGURES
Figure 1: Flow chart.
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Figure 2: A netlogo implementation.
Figure 3: Running the Netlogo applet: at the beginning, after the first time steps, when families spread throughout the grid, and  
at an emergence of different ethnic groups.
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